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Kain v. Department of Environmental Protection, 49 N.E. 3d. 1124
(Mass. 2016)
Sarah M. Danno
Global climate change and its chronic frustrations generated
passage of the Massachusetts Global Warming Solutions Act. The
Massachusetts Legislature imposed time-bound implementation mandates
on the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection with
Massachusetts residents acting as compliance watchdogs. In Kain, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts interpreted the Act in favor of
environmental integrity and strict agency compliance standards.
I. INTRODUCTION
Establishing a leading interpretation of the Massachusetts Global
Warming Solutions Act (“Act”), Kain v. Department of Environmental
Protection clarified the Massachusetts Department of Environmental
Protection’s (“Department”) regulatory obligations.1 Massachusetts
residents (“Plaintiffs”) argued the Department failed to comply with § 3(d)
of the Act’s companion statute, which requires it to set a declining
emission limit on greenhouse gas emitting sources.2 The Department
relied on its prior adoption of three regulatory programs aimed at
combating greenhouse gases to demonstrate its compliance with the Act.3
The Superior Court of Massachusetts agreed that the Department’s actions
substantially complied with the Act’s mandates and consequently ruled in
its favor.4 Plaintiffs appealed and were granted direct appellate review by
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Upon review, the Supreme
Judicial Court vacated the lower court’s judgment and determined the
Department failed to set greenhouse gas emissions limits as required under
the Act.5
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The continuous rise of global climate concerns among
Massachusetts residents led the Massachusetts Legislature (“Legislature”)
to enact solution-based legislation.6 Largely motivated by scientific
analysis linking climate change to increased greenhouse gas emissions, the
Legislature enacted “the most ambitious greenhouse gas reductions for a
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single state in the entire country.”7 The Act specifically charged the
Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs (“Secretary”), and his
counterpart - the Department, with setting legally binding limits on
identified emissions in Massachusetts.8 Additionally, § 6 of the Act
established the Climate Protection and Green Economy Act (“Statute”), a
companion statute placing specific time limits on the Secretary and the
Department to implement the Act’s mission and goals.9
The Act’s goals are designed to be achieved through the Secretary
and Department’s adherence to their prescribed regulatory duties.10 The
mandated duties are sequentially organized to build upon themselves.11
They include (1) establishing an emission reporting system, (2)
determining current and prospective emission levels if “business as usual”
management techniques are continued, (3) issuing statewide emission
limits to achieve specified percentage emissions reductions, and (4),
pursuant to Statute § 3(d), establishing regulations that provide for “a
desired level of declining annual aggregate emission limits for sources or
categories of sources that emit greenhouse gas emissions.”12 The
Department met each of these duties except the final mandate’s deadline
for establishing regulations on emission limits.13
The Department’s failure to meet the final mandate’s deadline
induced the Plaintiffs to petition the Department and demand it establish
emission-limiting regulations.14 In response, the Department held a public
hearing and resolved it had complied with the Act’s mandates.15 The
Department argued three regulatory measures it took to reduce emissions
demonstrated such compliance—limiting sulfur hexafluoride leaks,
placing a cap and trade market on carbon dioxide emissions, and
establishing an automobile emissions reduction program.16 After the
Department’s determination, Plaintiffs filed a complaint arguing the
Department failed to meet its statutory requirements.17
Seeking declaratory relief or a writ of mandamus, Plaintiffs
alleged the Department failed to fulfill its responsibility to establish
emissions limits for greenhouse gas emitting sources under § 3(d).18
Repeating its previous argument from the public hearing, the Department
insisted it met these requirements through its implementation of the three
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greenhouse gas limiting programs.19 The Superior Court ruled in the
Department’s favor, finding that the regulatory programs “substantially
complied” with the Department’s obligations under the Act.20 Plaintiffs
appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and the Court
granted direct appellate review.21
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided this case
by interpreting the statutory language of § 3(d) which reads, “[t]he
department shall promulgate the regulations establishing a desired level of
declining annual aggregate emission limits for sources or categories of
sources that emit greenhouse gas emissions.”22 Plaintiffs argued this
language required the Department to enact regulations that set a precise
annually declining limit on discharged emissions.23 The Department
countered that it need only set “aspirational targets.”24 Further, it
reasserted it met § 3(d)’s requirements by implementing three greenhouse
gas limiting programs.25
The Court reviewed the Department’s statutory interpretation de
novo and applied the general canons of statutory construction.26 In doing
so, the Court considered both § 3(d)’s plain meaning and legislative
evolution.27 This encompassed § 3(d)’s development, advancement
through the legislature, contemporary history, earlier legislation, customs
and conditions, and the overall scheme of positive law in which it exists.28
The Court concluded § 3(d)’s language was unambiguous and
dismissed the Department’s argument as essentially undermining the
integrity and intent of the Act.29 The Court began its analysis by
interpreting the phrase “emission limits” with respect to both Plaintiff’s
and the Department’s perspectives30. The Court applied two interpreting
principles.31 The first principle called for a word’s meaning to remain the
same when used in different parts of a statute.32 The second principle
entailed utilizing a plain meaning approach to statutory language.33 The
Court determined the provision’s plain language clearly intended
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“emissions limit(s)” to mean greenhouse gas emissions as shown by its
direct reference to limits on sources emitting greenhouse gases.34 The
Court added that the word “desired” in conjunction with the Act’s purpose,
exhibited the Legislature’s intent that the Department should set actual
limits to achieve emission reductions.35
The Court then analyzed § 3(d)’s remaining statutory language
with a focus on interpreting “declining annual aggregate emission limits”
for greenhouse gas emitters.36 The parties disagreed on whether the
language required the Department to set limits on source-specific
emissions as opposed to limits on source categories.37 The Court
highlighted the provision’s use of the plural form when referencing
“limits,” “sources,” and “regulations,” and held the Legislature intended
the Department to regulate multiple sources of greenhouse gas emitters.38
Additionally, the Court held the Act’s essential function would be
displaced by limiting a single source or source category.39 The Court then
applied a plain meaning approach to determine the Department was
required to set annually declining source emission limits.40
Upon clarifying the obligations of § 3(d), the Court determined
the three greenhouse gas reduction programs implemented by the
Department failed to meet § 3(d)’s directive.41 The sulfur hexafluoride
program addressed leakage prevention from gas-insulated switchgear
systems and set a maximum rate instead of a maximum limit.42 It did not
meet the mandated “source-wide volumetric cap on emissions” required
by § 3(d) because it failed to control the composite amount of leakage and
was thus unable to achieve the Act’s mandated reductions.43
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and carbon dioxide
budget trading program was implemented under a separate statute and its
goals and emission reductions were calculated into the “business as usual”
baseline utilized in the Act.44 Further, the program could not achieve the
emission reductions required by § 3(d) due to a carbon dioxide allowance
component included in its framework.45 This component undermined §
3(d)’s purpose by preventing the assurance of “mass-based” carbon
dioxide emissions reductions.46
Akin to the sulfur hexafluoride program, the Low Emission
Vehicle program also failed to comply with § 3(d)’s requirements due to
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its use of “rates” to establish emissions reductions as opposed to “limits”.47
The program adopted strict vehicle emission standards, but its regulations
failed to guarantee aggregate emissions reductions, a required component
of § 3(d).48 For the foregoing reasons, each of the department’s
implemented regulatory programs failed to meet § 3(d)’s demands.49
Finding that the material facts of this case were undisputed and an
actual controversy existed, the Court determined declaratory judgment the
proper remedy.50 After completing its statutory interpretation of § 3(d), the
Court remanded the case for judgment and declared that the Department
must enact specific and measurable regulations directed at multiple
sources or categories of greenhouse gas emitting sources.51 The
regulations must limit the amount of emissions discharged by each source
and the Department must place an annually declining limit on the
aggregate emissions of those sources.52
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has proven to be
an instrumental judicial body in global climate change litigation. The
Court’s decision in Kain further demonstrates its inclination to adopt the
policy of legislative intent over agency discretion. This case places strict
legislative compliance on the Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection and establishes a high standard for future
agency action and statutory interpretation cases. While this decision may
be regarded as a victory for the environmental movement, it is
substantially reliant on the intent and expression of the Massachusetts
Legislature. This decision has the potential to promote legislative clarity
and empower other states to combat global climate change through
legislative action.
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